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A SNOWBALL’S CHANCE IN HELLER: WHY 
DECASTRO’S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN 
STANDARD IS UNLIKELY TO SURVIVE 
Abstract: On June 1, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Decastro analyzed a Second Amendment challenge to 
a firearm regulation using a substantial burden standard. In so doing, the 
Second Circuit ignored much of the Supreme Court’s guidance in its 
2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. This Comment argues that 
the Decastro substantial burden standard offers insufficient protection for 
Second Amendment rights, and is therefore unlikely to survive. 
Introduction 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an individual right to 
keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, but it has not ar-
ticulated what standard should be used to evaluate the constitutionality 
of laws that restrict that right.1 Nonetheless, the Court has provided 
some guidance for how to treat Second Amendment challenges.2 Low-
er courts have tried to apply standards consistent with this guidance.3 
 In 2012, in United States v. Decastro, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit analyzed the constitutionality of a statute that the appel-
lant claimed infringed on his Second Amendment right to possess a gun 
for self-defense.4 The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), prohibits transport-
ing into one’s state of residence any firearm acquired outside that state.5 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). The Second Amendment 
states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. 
2 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (providing a list of presumptively lawful regulations un-
der the Second Amendment); see also infra notes 38–50 (discussing Heller’s guidance). 
3 See, e.g., Nordyke v. King (Nordyke I ), 644 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the 
substantial burden standard), vacated as moot, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Unit-
ed States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny); 
United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scruti-
ny); see also Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-
Mcdonald?, 21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 489, 492–93 (2012) (discussing the different 
standards of review lower courts have applied to Second Amendment challenges); infra notes 
51–87 (explaining the different standards of review applied by lower courts). 
4 United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–69 (2d Cir. 2012); see U.S. Const. amend 
II. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful . . . for any person . . . to 
transport into or receive in the State where he resides . . . any firearm purchased or other-
wise obtained by such person outside that State . . . .”). 
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Although the trend among other courts has been to apply some form of 
intermediate scrutiny to statutes burdening Second Amendment rights, 
the Second Circuit applied a more deferential standard.6  
  Part I of this Comment traces Decastro’s case from his purchase 
of a handgun to his conviction under § 922(a)(3) and finally to his sub-
sequent appeal to the Second Circuit.7 Part II examines the standards 
of review courts traditionally use to evaluate constitutional challenges 
and discusses the Supreme Court’s guidance for evaluating Second 
Amendment claims.8 Part II then compares the Second Amendment 
standard applied in Decastro with those applied by other courts.9 Finally, 
Part III argues that Decastro’s substantial burden standard is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s guidance and that some form of intermedi-
ate scrutiny is more appropriate.10 
I. Decastro’s Conviction and Second Amendment Challenge 
 In February 2005, Angel Decastro, a New York resident, purchased 
two firearms from a gun dealer in Florida.11 He left one of the pur-
chased handguns in Florida, but transported the other to New York, 
where he kept the pistol at his family’s dry-cleaning business for self-
defense.12 Decastro moved back to Florida in February 2006, but he 
gave the pistol to a relative before he left New York.13 In July 2006, po-
lice discovered Decastro’s pistol while investigating a tip about contra-
                                                                                                                      
6 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 165; see Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Standard: Gun 
Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 Md. L. Rev. 1131, 1141 (2011). Although most 
courts have applied intermediate scrutiny, at least one court has employed a two-tiered 
approach. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010). Under this ap-
proach, courts apply strict scrutiny to laws infringing on the Second Amendment’s core 
right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for self-defense and intermediate scru-
tiny to restrictions that do not infringe on this core right. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683. 
7 See infra notes 11–24 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 51–87 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 88–108 and accompanying text. 
11 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 161–62. Prior to 2002, Decastro lived in Florida, where he was li-
censed to own a handgun. Id. To purchase a handgun, Decastro was required to complete 
and sign Form 4473 of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Id. Form 
4473 gathers information on the purchaser and it must be filled out for each sale of a firearm 
by a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer. 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a) (2012). In February 
2005, Decastro falsely reported Florida as his state of residence. Decastro, 682 F.3d at 162. 
12 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 162. Decastro claimed to be involved in confrontation with gang 
members in July 2004. Id. at 161. He claimed he purchased the gun for self-defense be-
cause he feared retaliation at work. Id. 
13 Id. 
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band in a Bronx home.14 Because Decastro, a New York resident, had 
knowingly transported a pistol purchased in Florida to New York, he 
was indicted for violating § 922(a)(3).15 
 Decastro moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the stat-
ute violated his Second Amendment right to possess a gun for self-
defense.16 In his motion, he argued that § 922(a)(3) was unconstitu-
tional, both facially and as applied to him.17 The U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York declined to dismiss the indictment.18 
Following a bench trial, the court found Decastro guilty on the sole 
count of the indictment.19 Decastro appealed to the Second Circuit, 
asserting the same arguments he used to challenge his indictment.20 
 The Second Circuit dismissed Decastro’s as-applied challenge for 
lack of standing.21 To support his as-applied challenge, Decastro had 
asserted that New York’s licensing scheme for firearms was so restrictive 
that it was tantamount to a ban.22 But because he had never applied for 
a handgun license in New York, he lacked standing to challenge the 
regulation.23 The court did, however, analyze Decastro’s facial chal-
lenge to § 922(a)(3) on the merits.24 
II. Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review for  
Second Amendment Challenges 
 To analyze the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), the Sec-
ond Circuit selected a standard of review to apply to Second Amend-
ment challenges to gun regulations.25 Section A of this Part summarizes 
the standards of review traditionally applied to constitutional challenges 
and examines the Supreme Court’s guidance for Second Amendment 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 162. 
15 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting anyone other than a licensed im-
porter, manufacturer, dealer, or collector from transporting into his state of residence a 
firearm purchased or obtained outside of that state). 
16 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 162; see U.S. Const. amend II. 
17 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 162; see U.S. Const. amend II. 
18 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 162. In declining to dismiss the indictment, the court rejected 
Decastro’s as-applied challenge and did not address his facial challenge. Id. 
19Id. at 162–63. Decastro was sentenced to two years of probation and fined $100. Id. at 
163. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 164. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 164–69. 
25 See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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challenges.26 Section B explores the approaches other lower courts have 
taken when faced with Second Amendment challenges to gun regula-
tions.27 Finally, Section C discusses the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Decastro.28 
A. Traditional Standards of Review and the Supreme Court’s Guidance in 
District of Columbia v. Heller 
 Courts traditionally have applied one of three standards of review 
when analyzing challenges based on constitutional rights.29 Rational 
basis review requires that a government action is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.30 Rational basis is the most deferential 
standard, and its application only rarely leads to the invalidation of 
laws.31 Conversely, strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of re-
view.32 Strict scrutiny requires that a regulation is supported by a com-
pelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.33 In other words, strict scrutiny requires the government to 
utilize the least restrictive means to achieve its objectives.34 In between 
these standards lies the intermediate scrutiny standard of review.35 In-
termediate scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that an 
objective is important and that the connection between the challenged 
                                                                                                                      
26 See infra notes 29–50 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 51–69 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 70–87 and accompanying text. 
29 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). 
30 Sobel, supra note 3, at 495. 
31 Id.; see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985) (ap-
plying rational basis to ordinance challenged as discriminatory for the mentally retarded); 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 591–92 (1979) (concluding that the New York 
City Transit Authority’s no drugs employment policy, which postponed eligibility for em-
ployment until the job applicant completed a drug treatment program, was rational and 
supported by legitimate inferences). Moreover, unlike the other standards of review, under 
rational basis review the burden of proof remains with the party challenging a government 
action to show that there is no rational basis to believe that the law has any connection to a 
legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993). 
32 Sobel, supra note 3, at 494. 
33 Id. at 494–95; see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (applying strict 
scrutiny to race-based criteria in school admissions); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944) (holding that “legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny”). 
34 Sobel, supra note 3, at 494–95. 
35 Id. at 495; see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (applying in-
termediate scrutiny to gender regulation classifications); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
197–98 (1976) (same). 
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regulation and the objective is reasonable or substantial.36 Intermediate 
scrutiny, which is also considered a heightened standard, is not as diffi-
cult to overcome as strict scrutiny.37 
 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court recog-
nized for the first time an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, but 
it failed to articulate a standard of review.38 The Court noted that Heller 
was the Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment 
and that it did not expect to clarify the entire body of law with one de-
cision.39 
 Although the Court did not prescribe a standard of review for Sec-
ond Amendment challenges, it did give some guidance to lower 
courts.40 Specifically, the Court dismissed rational basis as a standard for 
Second Amendment challenges, given the Second Amendment’s status 
as a specific, enumerated right.41 The Court reasoned that if a rational 
basis were all that was necessary to overcome the right to bear arms, 
then the right would be meaningless.42 Additionally, the Court did not 
rule out strict scrutiny as a standard of review for challenges to firearm 
regulations.43 It did, however, list a number of presumptively lawful 
firearm regulations.44 The list included prohibitions on possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding carrying fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, and 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
                                                                                                                      
36 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010). The test for intermediate 
scrutiny has been described in a number of ways, but its basis is consistent—a standard less 
stringent than strict scrutiny, but where the burden of proof remains with the government. 
See id.; Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1470 (2009) (discussing how inter-
mediate scrutiny should be applied to gun restrictions under the Second Amendment). 
37 See Sobel, supra note 3, at 513. 
38 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also Robert A. Creamer, Note, History Is Not Enough: Using 
Contemporary Justifications for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpreting the Second Amendment, 
45 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 942 (2004) (“Interpreting the Second Amendment to protect [an] indi-
vidual right to bear arms should not create a fear of totally unrestricted firearm possession 
and use.”). 
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 626–27. 
41 Id. at 628 n.27. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 635. 
44 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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firearms.45 At least two scholars have argued that many of these pre-
sumptively lawful restrictions would not survive strict scrutiny.46 
 Justice Stephen Breyer, in his dissent, criticized the Court’s failure 
to establish a standard of review for evaluating restrictions on the right 
to bear arms.47 Justice Breyer called for an interest-balancing approach 
that would permit judges to weigh the rights of individuals against the 
government interest.48 The Court rejected the interest-balancing ap-
proach because it threatened to weaken the Second Amendment by 
giving too much power to judges to weigh a core constitutional right 
against the government’s policy concerns.49 Additionally, writing for the 
majority, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the interest-balancing ap-
proach as a departure from the traditionally expressed levels of scruti-
ny.50 
B. The Approaches of Other Courts 
 Since the Supreme Court handed down Heller, courts have strug-
gled with what standard to use when evaluating Second Amendment 
challenges.51 Many courts have avoided using a standard of review by 
trying to fit cases into the presumptively lawful restrictions listed in Hel-
ler.52 Other courts have decided cases while ignoring the standard of 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. 
46 See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard 
of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437, 438–39 (2011). 
47 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 689. 
49 Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion). 
50 Id. at 634. 
51 Sobel, supra note 3, at 492–93; see, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 
(3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 
2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny). The Supreme Court has decided 
one other challenge to gun regulations under the Second Amendment since it decided 
District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 
(2010); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 46, at 438. In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms to 
the states. 130 S. Ct. at 3026. Once again, the Court did not articulate what standard of 
review courts should use to evaluate Second Amendment challenges to gun regulations. 
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 46, at 439; see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
52 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(Mark)? Lower Courts 
and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1248 (2009); Sobel, supra 
note 3, at 509; see also, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(relying on Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulations to uphold a statute banning 
firearm possession by felons); United States v. Brunson, 292 Fed. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam) (citing Heller’s approval of laws prohibiting the possession of firearms 
by felons in dismissing petitioner’s challenge). 
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review question entirely.53 The courts that have addressed what stand-
ard to use have not yet come to a consensus.54 
 Despite this lack of consensus, the trend has been toward applying 
intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases.55 In 2010, in United 
States v. Marzzarella, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny in upholding a statute criminalizing the 
possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers.56 The court 
reasoned that the statute reasonably fit the government’s important 
goal of tracking handguns.57 Similarly, in 2010, in United States v. Chester, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate 
scrutiny when evaluating whether a federal statute banning firearm 
possession by domestic violence misdemeanants violated the Second 
Amendment.58 The court remanded the case after concluding that the 
government had not demonstrated a reasonable connection between 
preventing domestic gun violence and the permanent disarmament of 
all domestic violence misdemeanants.59 
 At least one court has applied intermediate scrutiny after stating 
that it would not select a particular standard of review.60 In 2010, in 
United States v. Skoien, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
vacated an earlier panel ruling applying intermediate scrutiny to a stat-
                                                                                                                      
53 See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[O]ur analysis is not 
based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of 
any of the 50 states.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“[W]e need not get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire, for no one doubts 
that the goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental ob-
jective.”). 
54 Sobel, supra note 3, at 492–93. Compare Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny), with Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (applying strict scrutiny). 
55 Kiehl, supra note 6, at 1141; see Chester, 628 F.3d at 683; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; see 
also Powell v. Tompkins, 2013 WL 765339, *16 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2013) (“The First Circuit 
has set out its own standard and, in line with the majority of its sister circuits, views chal-
lenged firearms regulations through the lens of intermediate scrutiny.”). 
56 614 F.3d at 97. 
57 Id. at 98. 
58 628 F.3d at 683. Although in Chester the Fourth Circuit applied an intermediate scru-
tiny standard to the statute at issue, the opinion articulated a two-tiered approach wherein 
statutes that infringe on a core Second Amendment right would receive strict scrutiny and 
regulations that did not infringe on a core right would receive intermediate scrutiny. See id. 
The court characterized the core Second Amendment right as the right of responsible, 
law-abiding citizens to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense. Id. A restriction on 
domestic violence misdemeanants fell outside of this core right, however, because misde-
meanants are by definition not law-abiding citizens. Id. As such, the court applied inter-
mediate scrutiny. Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101 (affirming the denial of ap-
pellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment under an intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
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ute prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing fire-
arms.61 On rehearing en banc, the court refused to address what stand-
ard should be used for Second Amendment challenges to gun regula-
tions.62 Nonetheless, the court upheld the statute after concluding that 
there was a substantial relation between the challenged statute and the 
important government objective of preventing armed mayhem.63 Thus, 
the court implicitly applied intermediate scrutiny.64 
 Despite this trend toward intermediate scrutiny, other standards 
have been applied to Second Amendment restrictions.65 For example, 
in 2009, in United States v. Engstrum, the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah applied strict scrutiny to a statute criminalizing firearm 
possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.66 In 2011, in Nordyke v. 
King, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a now-vacated 
opinion, applied a substantial burden standard in evaluating a Second 
Amendment challenge to an ordinance prohibiting gun shows on 
county property.67 Under this standard, only regulations that place a 
substantial burden on the right to keep and bear arms receive height-
ened scrutiny.68 Although the court later reheard the case en banc, it 
ultimately dismissed the challenge due to changes to the ordinance and 
therefore did not determine which standard should be applied in Sec-
ond Amendment cases.69 
                                                                                                                      
61 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642; see United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009), 
vacated, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. 2010); Frank Zonars, Comment, Shooting Heller In The 
Foot?: Applying and Misapplying District of Columbia v. Heller’s “Presumptively Lawful” Dicta 
in United States v. Skoien, 52 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 83, 89 (2011), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss6/8. 
62 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Nordyke v. King (Nordyke I ), 644 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the sub-
stantial burden standard), vacated as moot, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Eng-
strum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (applying strict scrutiny). 
66 Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. 
67 Nordyke I, 644 F.3d at 784. Although the substantial burden standard is not a tradi-
tional level of scrutiny, the Supreme Court has applied it to other constitutional rights. 
Sobel, supra note 3, at 519 n.213; see Volokh, supra note 36, at 1454–55. Most notably, the 
substantial burden standard has been used in abortion cases. See Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (applying the substantial burden standard to 
evaluate whether restrictions on access to abortions are constitutional). Some argue that 
this standard has also been applied, although not explicitly, to marriage, freedom of reli-
gion, and expressive association. Sobel, supra note 3, at 519 n.213; see Volokh, supra note 
37, at 1454–55. 
68 See Nordyke I, 644 F.3d at 784–86. 
69 See Nordyke v. King (Nordyke II ), 681 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
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C. The Second Circuit’s Solution in Decastro 
 The Second Circuit in Decastro applied a substantial burden stand-
ard substantially similar to the one applied by the Ninth Circuit in 
Nordyke.70 The substantial burden standard requires a court to make a 
threshold determination.71 First, a court must determine whether a 
regulation substantially burdens an individual’s Second Amendment 
rights.72 Only after determining that the challenged regulation imposes 
a substantial burden will the court apply a heightened level of scruti-
ny.73 Because it concluded that § 922(a)(3) did not impose a substantial 
burden, the Second Circuit did not address which type of heightened 
scrutiny should be applied in substantial burden cases.74 Additionally, 
although the court indicated that less restrictive laws would not receive 
heightened scrutiny,75 the court did not adequately justify the contin-
ued application of rational basis review to these less restrictive Second 
Amendment regulations.76 
                                                                                                                      
70 Compare Decastro, 682 F.3d at 161, with Nordyke I, 644 F.3d at 784. 
71 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 166 (“Rather, heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those re-
strictions that (like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate 
as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm 
for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 164–65 (“We therefore need not decide the level of scrutiny applicable to 
laws that do impose such a burden.”). In 2012, in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provided a partial answer to this question, while 
adding even more complexity to the Second Amendment analysis. See 701 F.3d 81, 93–101 
(2d Cir. 2012). In reviewing the constitutionality of a New York law requiring applicants to 
demonstrate “proper cause” to obtain a license to carry a concealed handgun in public, 
the Second Circuit drew a distinction between regulations imposing a substantial burden 
on core versus non-core Second Amendment rights. See id. at 93–95. The Court held that 
laws that impose a substantial burden on non-core Second Amendment rights are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 96–101. The court, however, declined to decide what 
level of scrutiny should be applied to laws imposing a substantial burden on a core Second 
Amendment right. Id. at 93. Consequently, the court determined that possession of a con-
cealed weapon in public is not a core Second Amendment right, and held that the proper 
cause requirement was substantially related to the state’s important interest in public safety 
and crime prevention. Id. at 98. 
75 See Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168. 
76 See id. at 166–67. It seems clear that, under this standard, statutes that do not impose 
a substantial burden on the Second Amendment would call for a less restrictive standard, 
such as rational basis. See id. at 167 n.5. The court, however, likely did not explicitly apply 
rational basis review because the Supreme Court rejected its use in Heller. See 554 U.S. at 
628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a ra-
tional basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). 
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 In evaluating § 922(a)(3), the Second Circuit held that the law did 
not place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment, and thus 
the court did not apply a heightened level of scrutiny.77 The court rea-
soned that the law did not place a substantial burden on the right to 
possess a gun for self-defense because it regulated rather than restricted 
gun use.78 To support its conclusion, the court emphasized both the 
available legal means of acquiring a firearm as well as the statute’s pur-
pose of preventing the circumvention of legitimate state gun laws.79 
 After applying the substantial burden standard to the statute, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that the standard is consistent with Heller.80 
The court observed that a complete ban on handguns would impose a 
substantial burden, calling for a heightened level of scrutiny.81 On the 
other hand, less restrictive laws, many of which were explicitly deemed 
constitutional in Heller, would be held to a lesser standard.82 The court 
concluded that although Heller did not explain why the presumptively 
lawful regulations it mentioned were constitutional, the natural expla-
nation is that they do not impose a substantial burden on the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.83 
 Finally, having dismissed Decastro’s as-applied challenge for lack of 
standing, and having concluded that § 922(a)(3) should not be subject-
ed to heightened scrutiny, the court focused on the standard for facial 
challenges.84 First, the court noted that facial challenges require proof 
that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep—a difficult bar to pass.85 
Then, the court dismissed the challenge reasoning that because the law 
did not substantially burden the Second Amendment and only sought 
to assist states in enforcing their gun laws, its sweep was plainly legiti-
mate.86 In using this analysis, however, the court did not provide specific 
guidance for how to address future as-applied challenges to gun regula-
tions that do not substantially burden the Second Amendment.87 
                                                                                                                      
77 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (2006). 
78 See Decastro, 682 F.3d at 166. 
79 Id. at 168. The court noted that the easiest way for a person to acquire a firearm is to 
purchase it in their state of residency. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3). 
80 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 165–66, 167 n.5; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
81 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 166; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
82 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 165; see Heller 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
83 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 165; see Heller 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
84 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168–69. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
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III. Decastro’s Substantial Burden Standard: Not What the 
Supreme Court Ordered 
 The Second Circuit’s application of the substantial burden stand-
ard in Decastro is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision 
in District of Columbia v. Heller.88 Although the Court in Heller did not 
articulate a specific standard, it did provide enough guidance to de-
termine what standards would provide adequate Second Amendment 
protection.89 
 Despite Heller’s rejection of the rational basis standard, the Second 
Circuit’s substantial burden standard permits courts to apply rational 
basis review so long as a regulation does not impose a substantial bur-
den on Second Amendment rights.90 After determining that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(a)(3) did not impose a substantial burden on the right to bear 
arms, the court rejected the challenge without further discussion.91 Hel-
ler’s rejection of the rational basis standard in Second Amendment ju-
risprudence makes it unlikely that the Supreme Court intended for 
courts to apply such a highly deferential standard, even if only in cases 
in which a court determines that no substantial burden is imposed by 
the challenged regulation.92 Thus, the Second Circuit’s substantial 
burden standard unjustifiably restricts the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Heller.93 
 Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s substantial burden standard too 
closely resembles the interest-balancing approach rejected in Heller.94 
The interest-balancing approach allows judges to evaluate how much a 
                                                                                                                      
88 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 634 (2008); United States v. 
Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168–89 (2d Cir. 2012). 
89 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
90 Id. at 628 n.27; see Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168–69. 
91 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168–69. Earlier in its opinion, the court justified the application 
of the rational basis standard to gun regulations that do not impose a substantial burden 
on Second Amendment rights. See id at 167 n.5. 
92 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. The Second Circuit asserted that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heller did not consider whether the rational basis standard should ap-
ply to laws that do not substantially burden the Second Amendment right. Decastro, 682 
F.3d at 167 n.5. The Court’s language in Heller, however, is broad enough to encompass 
such laws. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. The Court dismissed the application of rational basis as a 
mode of analysis for any specific, enumerated right. Id. 
93 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
94 Kiehl, supra note 6, at 1156; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. One federal judge, noting the 
similarities between the two standards, said “this court strongly doubts that the Heller ma-
jority envisioned the [substantial] burden standard when it left for another day the deter-
mination of the levels of scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.” Heller v. Dist. of Colum-
bia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2010) (challenging the District of Columbia’s new 
gun regulations following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the handgun ban). 
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challenged law is burdening Second Amendment rights and to weigh 
that burden against the government’s interest.95 Similarly, Decastro’s 
substantial burden standard allows judges to evaluate how much a chal-
lenged law is burdening Second Amendment rights, and if the burden 
is substantial, to apply a heightened form of scrutiny.96 Both approach-
es impermissibly empower judges to weigh a core constitutional right 
against amorphous policy concerns.97 Thus, given these similarities, the 
substantial burden standard has been criticized as inconsistent with Hel-
ler’s guidance.98 
 Moreover, the substantial burden standard, though innovative, 
does not sufficiently scrutinize laws constraining the Second Amend-
ment—a specific, enumerated right.99 Although this standard has been 
applied to other constitutional rights, the Court has not traditionally 
applied this standard to specific, enumerated rights.100 Additionally, 
one of the Heller Court’s critiques of the interest-balancing approach 
was that it was not one of the traditionally expressed standards of re-
view.101 The Court thus implied that these traditional standards better 
protect constitutional rights.102 Although an innovative standard could 
adequately protect a constitutional right, Heller’s emphasis on the Sec-
ond Amendment’s status as a specific, enumerated right suggests that 
the Court envisioned that lower courts would apply a traditional stand-
ard of scrutiny to evaluate Second Amendment challenges.103 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96 See 682 F.3d at 168. 
97 Kiehl, supra note 6, 1156; see Heller, 554 U.S. 634–35. 
98 Kiehl, supra note 6, at 1156; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168. 
99 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
100 The undue burden standard was criticized by the dissenters in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey as lacking any recognized basis in constitutional law. 505 
U.S. 833, 964 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s undue bur-
den standard was “created largely out of whole cloth”); id. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the “[undue burden standard] has no principled or coherent legal basis”). 
For specific, enumerated rights, the Court has traditionally applied strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
101 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. Although abortion cases originally received strict scrutiny, the Court has since 
shifted to a substantial burden standard. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; see Sobel, supra note 3, at 520–
21; Volokh, supra note 36, at 1471–72. The Court’s shift can be explained by the characteriza-
tion of abortion as an unenumerated constitutional right. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Reason-
ing From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 
59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433, 441-–42 (1992) (arguing that the right to abortion cannot be tied to 
any enumerated constitutional provision). But see Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: 
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381, 386 (1992) (dismissing the 
distinction between enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights). Given the conten-
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 Finally, the Second Circuit should have followed the trend among 
lower courts of applying some form of intermediate scrutiny in Second 
Amendment cases.104 Intermediate scrutiny is a heightened standard 
and therefore likely provides sufficient protection for the Second 
Amendment given its status as a specific, enumerated right.105 Further, 
intermediate scrutiny is consistent with Heller’s guidance because it is 
restrictive enough to strike down a complete ban on handguns, but also 
permissive enough to justify upholding the presumptively lawful re-
strictions listed in Heller.106 Other courts have recognized this balance 
and applied intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases.107 The 
Second Circuit should have done the same.108 
Conclusion 
 The Second Circuit in Decastro was asked to decide whether 
§ 922(a)(3) was constitutional under the Second Amendment. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court did not establish a standard of review for 
these challenges in Heller, it did provide some guidance for future cases. 
Yet, the Second Circuit did not follow Heller’s guidance. By employing 
the substantial burden standard to decide whether the statute in Dec-
astro should be subject to heightened scrutiny, the Second Circuit em-
ployed a standard that was too deferential and too similar to the inter-
est-balancing approach rejected in Heller. Instead, the Second Circuit 
should followed the lead of its sister circuits and applied intermediate 
scrutiny to assess the validity of § 922(a)(3). 
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tious nature of abortion, it is possible that the Court in Heller emphasized the Second 
Amendment’s status as an enumerated right to specifically contrast it with abortion. See Heller, 
554 U.S. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerat-
ed constitutional rights, banning [handguns] from the home . . . would fail constitutional mus-
ter.” (emphasis added)). 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to a ban on firearm possession by domestic violence misdemeanants); 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
to a law criminalizing possession of guns with obliterated serial numbers). 
105 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; see Sobel, supra note 3, at 513. 
106 Kiehl, supra note 6, at 1145–46; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
107 See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. 
108 See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. 
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